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ABSTRACT 
 
The political capture of copyright law by industry groups 
has inadvertently led to orphan works problems arising in less 
organized industries, such as publishing. Google Book Search 
(GBS) is a prime example of how private ordering can 
circumvent legislative inefficiencies. Digital technologies such 
as GBS can open up a new business model for publishers and 
other content industries, centered around aggregated rights 
holdings. However, the economic inertia that private ordering 
represents may pose a threat to the knowledge-oriented goals of 
copyright law.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Congress has been accused of many things, but initiative is 
generally not one of them. The current state of copyright law, with wildly 
longer term limits and automatic protection, is a result of continuous 
content-industry lobbying to protect their valuable, aging intellectual 
property. As a result, the problem of orphan works—where copyright 
holders are untraceable, and strict liability prevents the work’s further 
use—has arisen, particularly in less centralized industries, such as 
publishing. Private ordering offers an path around the Sisyphean task of 
legislative change, as parties seek to optimize economic benefit through 
private contracting or settlement. 
¶2 Google Book Search (GBS) is a prime example of such ordering 
at work. GBS holds promise as potentially being able to surmount the 
orphan works problem, leveraging Google’s financial might to assume 
the liability risks.  Google also has the potential to redefine the 
publishing industry model, creating a payment modeled around small 
access payments from a large library of archived works. However, this 
model has potentially worrisome implications for the state of copyright 
law and for the future of the public domain.   
                                                     
1 Executive Editor, Technical Editor, Duke Law & Technology Review. J.D. 
Candidate, Duke University, 2011. B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 2008. I 
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I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PRESSURE GROUPS 
¶3 The emergence of so-called “pressure groups”—political 
organisms designed to promote particular economic interests—is 
arguably the most significant development in American politics in the 
last century.2 Their emergence has called into question the independence 
of the “public interest” from private economic interests.3  The growth of 
government results in increased “differential or discriminatory impact on 
the separate and identifiable groups of the population,” which 
incentivizes investment in obtaining favorable differential gains through 
political lobbying.4 Buchanan and Tullock explain the cyclical nature of 
this relationship: “[t]he organized pressure group thus arises because 
differential advantages are expected to be secured through the political 
process, and in turn, differential advantages for particular groups are 
produced because of the existence of organized activity.”5 In other 
words, the success of one organized pressure group successfully 
disrupting the prior “general welfare” equilibrium incentivizes further 
collective action, as more groups look to capture their political interest 
niche.6 Economic theory suggests this will eventually lead to a new 
equilibrium, given full organization.7 This new balance—assuming it 
exists—does not mean that discriminatory legislation will cease to be 
adopted.8 Interest group activity is a function of net profit expected from 
the political process.9 Given unequal power balances within particular 
market segments, pressure groups can secure legislation that provides 
benefits that “are not applied generally to the whole population.”10
¶4 This power imbalance manifests in modern copyright law. The 
consolidation and growth of copyright-reliant industries has not been met 
with a suitably large political counterweight.
 
11
                                                     
2 JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 283 (Univ. of Mich. 
Press, 1962). For further discussion of collective action problems, see generally 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
 The result is a spiral 
3 Id. at 284–85. 
4 Id. at 286. 
5 Id. at 286–87. 
6 Id. at 287–88. 
7 Id. at 288. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 286. 
10 Id. at 287. 
11 See Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American 
Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 139, 176 (2008).  
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effect, where copyright laws have become increasingly more beneficial 
to interested pressure groups.12
II. COPYRIGHT EXPANSION AND ORPHAN WORKS 
  
¶5 Over the past half-century, content industries have gained 
control of the legislative pipeline for copyright to a degree likely 
unsurpassed by any other modern cartel.13 The 1976 Copyright Act , for 
instance, was entirely drafted through a series of negotiations—at the 
urging of the U.S. Copyright Office—between authors, publishers, and 
other content owners.14 More recently, the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (CTEA) pitted studios and publishing interests, led 
by Disney, against a coalition of “college professors, constitutional 
lawyers, librarians[,] and small town school teachers.”15 Since the 1960s, 
Congress has expanded the copyright term eleven times, after expanding 
it just twice from 1790 to 1960.16 The economic size of the copyright 
industries should not be understated: At the time of the CTEA’s passage, 
they made up nearly six percent of American gross domestic product, 
and one of the U.S.’s largest exports.17 Disney in particular stood to lose 
control of billions of dollars worth of copyrights— Mickey Mouse and 
Winnie-the-Pooh alone were valued at nearly $8 billion dollars each—if 
the CTEA was not passed.18
¶6 As copyright protection began to expand, and particularly as it 
expanded well past the death of the author, the problem of orphan works 
arose. Most significant to the explosion of the orphan problem was the 
dropping of the renewal requirement. This shifted copyright from an 
“opt-in” system, which required content creators to actively maintain 
copyright, to an “opt-out” system.
 In simple terms, the cartel-like organization 
of the content industries, coupled with a lack of an economically 
significant lobbying opponent, has led copyright inexorably down the 
road of increased term protection.   
19
                                                     
12 Id. 
 Thus, works that might enter the 
public domain due to a low commercial value now remain covered by 
13 Id. (“Powerful media forces—such as phonograph, radio, and film studios—
dominated copyright in a way that no single handful of manufacturers could 
have controlled the commercial world of trademark.”). 
14 See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative 
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858-879 (1987). 
15 Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 287, 293 (2002). 
16 Id. at 312. 
17 Id. at 294. 
18 Id. at 292.  
19 Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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copyright.20 With such a large population of copyrighted works, there are 
some works that have nigh-untraceable origins. However, the inability to 
locate a copyright holder does not protect users from the strict liability 
hammer of copyright law.21 Whatever value those works originally had 
as foundational materials for other works is then lost, as future use is 
chilled by the possibility of litigious parents returning to protect their 
(previously valueless) orphan work.22
¶7 The issue of orphan works arises largely as a side effect of 
content-industry efforts to expand copyright protection, and lingers 
largely because there is no group with a significant enough incentive to 
push for such a change. Large content-providers meticulously catalogue 
their copyrights, and in any event are fairly easy to track down for 
licensing.
 
23 Orphan works generally tend to be either below their radar or 
within their contingency budgets.24 On the other hand, a creator of a 
derivative work does not know that she has encountered an orphan works 
problem until she actually does, and cannot find the current copyright 
holder of a work she wishes to use.25
                                                     
20 Id. 
 This uncertainty surrounding 
orphan works encounters inhibits the creation of an interest group to 
address the issue, as the potential members of such a group are not only 
nebulously defined and spread out, but also may lack the will or 
wherewithal to pursue the issue further. This creates a classic problem of 
collective action, in which “large collectivities with diffuse interests” 
(academics, librarians, etc) are “systematically disadvantaged in the 
political process as compared to smaller groups with more acute 
21 The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearings before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Committee of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131, at 17 (2008) [hereinafter Peters 
Statement] (statement of Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html. 
22 Simply providing a good-faith search exception raises other sticky legal issues 
that are outside the scope of this note, such as unduly increasing the publicity 
burden on copyright owners, increased litigation costs, and a policy 
reconsideration of how copyright should function relative to the continued 
monetization of a work.  
23 See Comment of the Motion Picture Association of America, In re Orphan 
Works, No. 646 (Mar. 22, 2005), at 2, 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0646-MPAA.pdf; see also 
Comment of the Recording Industry Association of America, In re Orphan 
Works, No. 687 (Mar. 22, 2005), at 1, 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0687-RIAA.pdf [hereinafter 
RIAA Comment]. 
24 See id. 
25 See Peters Statement, supra note 21, at 16. 
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interests” (Big Content) because “larger groups face higher organizing 
costs and are affected more severely by incentives to free ride.”26
¶8 Further, the number of orphan works actually in existence is 
virtually indiscernible.
  
27 The fluid social mobilization through orphan 
works-related obstacles further magnifies the collective action problem. 
While an orphan work issue may prevent some people from creating a 
work, others may move on and utilize a substitute work, and the orphan 
works problem encountered becomes untraceable. A calculation of the 
orphan works population would almost invariably be reliant on the 
number of unsuccessful or abandoned private searches by any and every 
potential user. Further, gauging the severity of the problem would require 
examining the preventive impact orphan works have on the ability to 
create a new work—whether users find a substitute or just accept the risk 
of suit. As such efforts to estimate the scope of orphan works problems 
generally dissolve into speculation.28
¶9 Further, the scale of orphan works problems vary widely across 
various content formats.
 
29 For instance, within the relatively consolidated 
music and movie industries, a serious effort has been made to create 
databases and clearinghouses which provide owner information for 
copyright protected works.30 There is abundant economic incentive in 
these industries for such clearinghouses, especially in music, where the 
explosion of sampling-based production enables works to be revenue-
producing long after release.31
¶10 Due to the cross-industry reach of copyright law, pressure group 
lobbying from the music and movie industries has inadvertently spawned 
externalities in other industries. This drag-along effect of industry-
neutral law is not unique to copyright. In patent law, lobbying efforts of 
multiple, discordant industry groups have resulted in a tangle of law that 
fails to appropriately account for the innovation models of any 
 In industries such as publishing, there is 
little incentive for clearinghouses, as out of print books or artwork are 
more difficult to locate and build upon. 
                                                     
26 Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New 
Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 811 (2008).  
27 Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes 
for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 266 (2006). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 267. 
30 See MPAA Comment, supra note 23, at 1; RIAA Comment, supra note 23, at 
1. Although each industry trade group generally recognizes potential problem 
spots with regards to orphan works, each group’s position is that it is generally a 
miniscule part of their population of controlled works.  
31 See RIAA Comment, supra note 23, at 1. 
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industry.32
¶11 Recent attempts to forge legislative compromise with regards to 
orphan works have been unsuccessful.
 In copyright, this effect is more unidirectional, specifically in 
the area of term extensions. Here, publishing has been dragged along into 
a new copyright regime, without the mechanisms in place to account for 
the orphan-works problem.  
33 Graphic arts and photography 
groups have strong incentive to oppose such legislation, as more often 
than not, information about the creator of a work is not available on the 
work itself,34
III. ORPHAN WORKS, PUBLISHING, AND KNOWLEDGE 
MAINTENANCE 
 and the amount of effort required to show a so-called 
“good-faith” search would likely be quite minimal, even given modest 
publicity and monetization efforts on the part of the original creator.  In 
short, there is little evidence that the legislative logjam will be broken, 
particularly given the sweeping applicability of copyright across media 
formats.  
¶12 Within the publishing industry, the orphan works problem is 
much more significant. The business of publishing is highly 
decentralized, and publishers do not typically maintain long continued 
relationships with the author of a given book, especially if printing is 
limited to a single run. There is little business incentive to maintain a 
rights database for out-of-print books, which are presumably out-of-print 
because they were not profitable enough to continue printing. The 
publishing industry has undergone several shifts in printing formats 
before making the shift to digital formats in the mid-1980s. Many of 
these pre-digital printing formats were proprietary to individual printers. 
As a result, not only would a publisher likely be unable to reprint books 
made before the shift to digital without significant effort, an older 
publisher may not even be able to confirm that they printed a particular 
book. Adding to the problem is an extremely fragmented publishing 
industry, raising the possibility that a particular publishing house 
(generally the most reliable way to find a rights-holder) may no longer 
exist.  
                                                     
32 For further discussion of the problems of an industry-neutral patent system, 
see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (1999).  
33 See, e.g., H.R. 5136, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006); 
H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008). 
34 Compare to creator information in other media, such as liner notes, metadata, 
or central databases in the music industry, credit reels in the movie industry, and 
publisher and author information in most books. 
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¶13 Due to the uncertain character of orphan rights distribution and a 
fragmented publishing industry, the most significant advocate for orphan 
works legislation continues to be libraries, particularly university 
libraries. From 1999 to 2001, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) 
Libraries attempted a feasibility study of digitizing their library. CMU 
attempted to track down copyright owners for a random sample of books 
published since 1923, with the intent of gaining permission for 
digitization.35 In their response comment to the U.S. Copyright Office’s 
2005 inquiry on Orphan Works, they detail the results of their study.36
¶14 According to a rough estimation CMU performed based on 
WorldCat publication database numbers and studies done by the U.S. 
Copyright Office, only 7% of book copyrights were renewed between 
1923 and 1963, when protection became automatic.
  
37 While the numbers 
are not directly comparable to today, copyright renewal rates provide an 
indication as to what proportion of the copyright-eligible population feel 
strongly enough about the continued profitability potential of their work 
to warrant the effort of preventing it from entering the public domain.38  
Renewal rates also provide a further explanation for the lack of 
incentives on the part of publishers to keep track of older works – if the 
works were worth copyrighting, someone would have done so.39
¶15 For their sample, Carnegie Mellon next attempted to track down 
the copyright owners of books that were not in the public domain. 
Despite the original claimant being listed at the U.S. Copyright Office, 
for 22% of books sampled, the publisher of a book simply could not be 
found.
  
40
                                                     
35 Comment of the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, In re Orphan Works, No. 
537 (Mar. 22, 2005), at 3, 
 A further 11% of books were eliminated from the study because 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf 
[hereinafter CMUL Comment]. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 2. 
38 Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright 2–3 (U. Chi. Dep’t L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 154, 2002), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319321 
(“[F]ewer than 11% of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964 were 
renewed at the end of their 28-year term, even though the cost of renewal was 
small”). 
39 It is worth noting that the U.S. Copyright Office charged Carnegie Mellon 
$150 to run a title search for seven titles published between 1923 and 1963 in 
order to determine if the copyrights had been renewed. Although this initial step 
of investigation may not be expensive on a small scale, for a library digitization 
project the step may be prohibitively expensive, an important consideration for 
the future.   
40 CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 3. 
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third-party copyright ownership made tracking down the proper owner 
excessively complicated.41 Even when a publisher could be located, they 
were either unresponsive (36%), unaware of having published older 
books, lacked proper records regarding a particular work (dead-ending 
the search), or unsure what rights they possessed regarding a work.42 The 
transaction costs of tracking down copyright owners in the publishing 
world can be a significant deterrent,43 as can the wildly variant 
restrictions and fees that publishers can demand, even for continued 
access to out-of-print books.44 A simple lack of proper rights cataloguing 
can further deter users from a search—CMU averaged over 100 days per 
copyright owner before an answer was received, sometimes after 
multiple letters of inquiry.45
¶16 Concordant with the copyright concerns is the general policy 
goal of knowledge maintenance. Carnegie Mellon’s study suggests that 
over half of the books published in the United States since 1923 are now 
out of print.
 A substantial portion of orphan works 
problems in publishing may thus be a function of poor industry 
organization. 
46 Further, this wealth of knowledge is literally 
disintegrating. Older books printed on non-acid-free paper will 
eventually dissolve, and many out of print books are in advanced states 
of decay, a process the best preservation efforts can only slow.47
                                                     
41 Id. 
 As 
transaction costs and difficulty in finding copyright owners inhibit the 
ability of scholars and creators to build off of these works, the 
increasingly poor condition of these works will further deter their use. 
The fragile nature of books demands a solution not only in copyright law 
but also in digitization. Current copyright law stifles efforts to digitize, 
42 Id. at 3–4. 
43 See CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 5 (noting the $78 transaction cost per 
title in a separate study seeking to digitize 278 rare books, which did not include 
“the cost of consultations with university legal counsel, creating the database, 
managing the project, or intermittent labor costs in 2004 invested in locating and 
finalizing negotiations with some authors and estates.”).  
44 It is worth noting, as a purely speculative point, there is significant incentive 
for publishers to err on the side of claiming copyright for a past work, 
particularly in the context of a library digitization project, which would 
essentially provide the opportunity to re-monetize every book that publisher has 
ever printed. The difficulty of each individual transaction combined with the 
scale of many transactions on the part of the library (or scholar) would almost 
guarantee that the potential licensee would never be able to second-guess the 
copyright status of the publishing house.  
45 CMUL Comment, supra note 35, at 5.  
46 See id. at 6. Estimation extrapolated from figure on page.    
47 See id. at 6.   
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preserve, or use many of these rapidly expiring works. Ultimately, this 
magnifies orphan works problems to scales worthy of attracting 
attention. The digital era has arrived in time to allow preservation of the 
rapidly expanding printed record. Orphan works underscore the fact that 
this preservation effort’s largest obstacle is not technological, but legal; 
an ironic reality, given copyright’s constitutionally stated purpose of 
promoting knowledge.   
¶17 The digitization of the world’s printed knowledge, or even the 
libraries of a dozen major universities, eventually boils down to an issue 
of scale. Anything that was last printed before the mid-1980s—still some 
10 million books—will likely need to be manually scanned, due to a lack 
of transferrable digital form.  
IV. ENTER GOOGLE 
¶18 Google hardly needs an introduction. Far and away the most 
successful company of the late-1990s tech boom, Google has a self 
professed mission “to organize the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful.”48 All of this data is used as a driver 
for Google’s market-dominating internet advertising engine. In October 
2004, the company launched Google Books—then called Google Print, 
and began digitally scanning books from publishers and university 
libraries. In October 2009, Google announced that they had scanned their 
10 millionth book.49
¶19 In essence, Google Book Search allows copyright holders to 
collect revenue from digital access to a work. In some cases, digitization 
will no doubt reignite interest in a forgotten work, perhaps enough to 
warrant a reprinting. This new opportunity for revenue with little 
additional cost on the part of the creator will in theory incentivize 
copyright holders of orphan works to come forward. However, while 
publishing houses with a large cache of copyrights could stand to reap a 
tidy sum, it is unlikely that the majority of individual book-owners will 
see much in the way of revenue, due simply to a lack of queries 
 Depending on the copyright status, users are 
permitted to search within books and view excerpts of a few pages 
surrounding their search term.  Google’s effort brought them a lawsuit 
from the Author’s Guild and five major publishing companies—McGraw 
Hill, Pearson, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley and Sons. As 
of this writing, the settlement is still being negotiated.  
                                                     
48 Comment of Google, In re Orphan Works, No. 681 at 1 (Mar. 25, 2005), 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0681-Google.pdf [hereinafter 
Google Comment]. 
49 Sergey Brin, A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A31, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/opinion/09brin.html?_r=1.   
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involving their book.50 However, the fact remains that the revenue 
regime constructed by Google is far more flexible than that of traditional 
publishing, even given the increasing ability of publishers to print 
smaller runs of books (even down to a run of one). In essence, GBS 
allows “the producer to capture more of the benefit from what he 
produces. . . . The higher the return to producing intellectual property the 
more intellectual property will be produced.”51 In addition, a privatized 
database allows Google and copyright owners to price discriminate based 
on levels of access. Access to searches and excerpts may be free, access 
to an entire work may require a fee for individuals, and large commercial 
or academic organizations may be charged high prices for wide-reaching 
subscriptions.52
¶20 Given the particulars of the parties involved, it is right to posit 
that Google made the strategic choice to provoke a lawsuit in order to 
force a unified settlement. As previously discussed, the transaction costs 
for investigating the copyright status of books is prohibitively high, a 
problem which is only exacerbated by the scale of the project. Once an 
actual lawsuit is filed, the incentive to settle for both sides is high. 
  
¶21 It has been argued that Google likely would have had a strong 
fair use argument in the vein of its victory over Perfect 1053, but the 
actual probability of success Google might have had at trial is irrelevant, 
so long as the probability was significant to give the plaintiff publishers 
pause. Not pursuing a fair use argument at trial also allows Google to 
negotiate additional ways of monetizing its new digital book collection- 
such as getting a cut of eventual digital book distribution. Just as 
important as the perceived strength of its arguments at trial, Google’s 
size and cash reserves ensure that it has the financial means to pursue the 
lawsuit as far as necessary.54
                                                     
50 A comparable system is Google’s AdSense program, which allows individuals 
and businesses to place Google-generated advertisements on their websites, in 
exchange for a cut of the revenue. Google offers the option of “cost-per-click” 
or “cost-per-1000-impressions”. For the individual advertiser, these rates tend to 
be expressed in pennies, rather than dollars. See Google Adsense Help, 
 Thus, Google’s negotiating position, as 
http://adsense.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=9902 and 
http://adsense.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=21591 (last visited 
March 27, 2010).  
51 David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie 
Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help”, 13 BERKELEY TECH 
L.J. 1151, 1169 (1998).   
52 See id. at 1169-70.   
53 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). Google 
was also a party in Perfect 10.  
54 Consider as points of comparison, Google’s 2008 revenue of $21 billion (on 
31% growth) compared to the entire book publishing industry at $40 billion (on 
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compared to a fragmented publishing industry currently in a state of flux, 
is quite strong. 
V. MARKET OPTIMIZATION AND THE LONG TAIL  
¶22 The copyright status of a work does not guarantee profitability, 
absent some market force that demands access to the work in sufficient 
quantity to warrant further production. The renewal requirement of 
copyright was an expression of copyright’s supporting role in the 
monetization of a creative work. Absent this requirement, the public is 
prevented from accessing works that have no present commercial 
exploitative value, thus creating a dead-weight societal loss and 
subverting the knowledge dissemination aim of copyright. Along this 
vein, William Landes and Richard Posner have argued for a return to 
copyright renewal practices, but with the twist of allowing near indefinite 
renewal.55 The appeal of this argument is strong: Renewals would thus 
be driven by the presence of sufficient economic incentive, allowing for 
the “optimal use of property rights.” In the publishing world, despite the 
rise of publishing on demand and e-publishing, the cost of a new print-
run for out-of-print books may still be prohibitively high56, or at least 
higher than whatever additional revenue a publisher might be able to 
extract from the run. Compare this to other media, where the cost of 
pressing another CD or copying another song is close to zero.57
¶23 Chris Anderson argues that digitization has rendered the “hit-
driven” economic model obsolete.
 Private 
ordering can help further hone this optimization by focusing on the long 
tail of out-of-print works. 
58 Cost-revenue analysis of physical 
media is calculated in groups of thousands: books are not printed unless 
they will make up for the cost of producing a run, and Wal-Mart will not 
sell a CD unless they believe they can sell 100,000 copies of it, in order 
to cover retail overhead.59 Over half of Amazon.com’s revenue comes 
from books that are not available in a brick-and-mortar bookstore, or 
books that do not sell in sufficient quantities to warrant bookstore 
placement.60
                                                                                                                       
1% growth). Google also sits on cash reserves of some $14 billion, enough to 
purchase one of the larger publishers, McGraw Hill (market capitalization: $9.28 
billion) outright.  
 The bulk of Google’s advertising revenue comes from a 
55 See Landes and Posner, supra note 38.  Landes and Posner also argue for a 
higher renewal fee, so as to further crystallize the incentive calculus.  Id.   
56 A problem made worse the older the book is.  
57 See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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swarm of smaller websites and search queries, rather than from a small 
group of rich repeat buyers.61 The implication for copyrighted content is 
clear: as digitization brings marginal cost close to zero and allows for 
increasingly fine-tuned price discrimination, the optimal approach for 
content owners is to maximize the quantity of content available for 
purchase, regardless of forecasted success. 62
¶24 Long tail models reconfigure economies of scale, emphasizing 
the value of aggregation above all else. Digitization minimizes the 
marginal cost of production for “soft” content industries such as music, 
movies, and eventually books and art by obviating the need for products 
to take physical form.
  
63
¶25 This economic model has two impacts. First, it lowers the barrier 
for continued profitability on “back catalogues,” content that has already 
been through a primary market cycle. This incentivizes rights-holders not 
only to consolidate, but to advocate longer terms for rights exclusivity, in 
order maximize the economic gain realizable only through large 
aggregate rights holdings. Second, content creators can more cheaply 
distribute their works to a wider audience due to a lower initial overhead. 
However, initial costs of content creation may still be high, and the 
individual creators on balance will not accumulate significant revenue in 
the long tail from an individual work, especially not when compared with 
the initial market cycle.
 Eventually, the only costs involved are the 
logistics of database maintenance and delivery.   
64
                                                     
61 Id.  
  Nonetheless, for content-industry corporations 
that hold wide back catalogues of works and rights, digitization opens the 
door to this new economic style. GBS represents a market-optimizing 
instance of private ordering, using near-zero marginal cost to allow 
publishers to take advantage of the long tail. Google is able to use its vast 
financial resources and technical expertise to implement a project that a 
fragmented, low-margin publishing industry would likely not be able to 
execute on its own. Perhaps just as importantly, Google is covering the 
primary capital and labor overhead: the physical act of scanning and 
digitizing several million books. In effect, the publishing industry is 
getting a revamp of the economic engine for next to nothing. Google’s 
ad-driven business model is contingent on as many users as possible 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Anecdotally, the cost for content companies of tracking individual licensing 
micro-revenues for content creators may exceed the actual revenue generated, or 
the revenue may be less than the cost that an artist would have to expend in 
court to retrieve lost fees. There are indications that this may already be the case 
in the music industry. While this may also be resolvable through class action, it 
again raises the hackles of collective action problems.   
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being online for as long as possible. This model allows Google to 
essentially give away its services, so long as it keeps users online, and 
therefore on Google. This alignment of interests makes Google an ideal 
partner for a digitizing publishing industry.  
VI. THE IMPACT OF DIGITIZATION  
¶26 Google’s approach is not without problems. Concerns have been 
raised over granting Google a virtual monopoly over orphan works, or 
even book digitization, given the massive barriers to entry in the form of 
labor, money, and time. In essence, Google has leveraged its business 
strength in one area, web search, and used it to essentially force the 
cooperation of the publishing industry. These antitrust concerns, while 
worthy of discussion, are beyond the scope of this note. More pressing 
here is the potential for Google’s incentive program to lead to an ironic 
inversion of copyright law. This manifests in two arenas: fair use and the 
public domain.  
¶27 First, GBS can contractually circumvent fair use. By allowing 
content owners to determine the size of the excerpts that surround a 
search query, a potential user may be forced to pay for more complete 
access. This problem is most profound with regards to rarer works and 
scholarly research, especially ones for which paper copies may be in 
exceedingly poor condition. The transaction costs of securing access to a 
rare work are unfairly reallocated to the copyright holder. Further, the 
possibility of perfect price discrimination with regards to use and access 
restrictions to a work may eventually undermine the fair use defense, due 
to the presence of a readily available licensing market.  
¶28 Fair use exists as a result of the market’s failure to foster socially 
desirable uses of copyrighted works. Rights-holders have little incentive 
to selectively yield their copyright, particularly when these uses may 
paint their original work in a negative or undesirable light. Fair use is an 
attempt to prevent monopolies on certain expression from shrinking First 
Amendment protections, as well as to foster the practices of criticism and 
academic study, which ultimately maximizes a given work’s contribution 
to the overall knowledge base.  
¶29 Second, GBS threatens to further slow the flow of books into the 
public domain. While the settlement explicitly excludes public domain 
works, a significant tactical question arises for rightsholders when book 
copyrights expire and enter the public domain. It would be in the public 
interest for Google to then provide open access to that particular book, at 
no charge, and indeed it is questionable whether Google would have to 
continue paying the copyright holder at all for continued use of the work. 
While the benefits of this strategy are unclear, it is possible that 
publishing houses might try to leverage permission for books they do 
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still control in order to maintain revenue streams on books that they once 
controlled. Such a deadlock could threaten to undermine the entire 
system. A compromise could be reached by opening up access and 
continuing to split the advertising revenue. However, this is reliant on 
Google pushing for open access as works enter the public domain, an 
uncertain proposition, although it seems likely that universities would 
advocate for an increase in the public domain. Otherwise, there is a 
social loss in the form of a smaller public domain.  
¶30 To a point, such harms are speculative. However, the question 
raised is significant: Does private ordering undermine copyright policy? 
If copyright law is merely a matter of market optimization by means of 
maximum renumeration for creators, surely a private ordering system is 
ideal, particularly with the advent of micropayments and electronic 
transaction costs that near zero. Indeed, there is a strong argument for 
reframing copyright in this context, particularly given the dependence of 
the American economy on copyright-protected exports. 
VII. PRIVATE ORDERING  
¶31 Private ordering manifests itself in a knowledge-based economy, 
where the boundaries between industry and market segment are fluid and 
easily surmounted. Apple, Google, and Microsoft are so successful 
precisely because of their ability to transcend these industry boundaries. 
This fluidity means that rivals in one market segment may be allies in 
another—Google’s YouTube and Maps services are prominently 
featured on the iPhone, even while Google launches a competing 
smartphone operating system. It also requires a new understanding of 
how these actors will interact across market segments. Public choice 
theory presumes that social actors have fixed interests, and that they do 
not need to make complex judgments to determine how their interests 
can be advanced. It also does not explain how nonmaterial motivations 
and resources affect collective action.65
¶32 Outside of copyright, private ordering is already a highly 
prevalent phenomenon—most legal disputes in the U.S. are resolved 
without “intervention of the public legal process.”
 Private ordering in the 
information economy is then primarily an issue of framing. 
66 In intellectual 
property, private ordering is on the rise, most notably in the management 
of patent licensing.67
                                                     
65 Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 824. 
 Private ordering is simply good business.  
66 Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionally: Private Ordering of Public 
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516 (2009). 
67 Lawrence M. Sung, The New Private Ordering of Intellectual Property, 4 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2009),  available at 
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¶33 It is important to note that private ordering is not ignorant of the 
current state of the law, nor does it necessarily seek to change existing 
law. Law has a gravitational pull, and shapes the existing discourse. 
Mobilizations in response to law may serve to strengthen existing law, 
rather than unsettle it. Niva Elkin-Koren’s critique of Creative Commons 
is structured along similar lines, arguing that the use of a licensing tool, 
“of property rights, backed up by contract, is bound to entail a logic of 
exclusion,” and strengthens the conception of information as private 
property.68 Framing shifts are shifts in discourse, and in that sense, even 
the term “intellectual property” represents a shift, introducing the term 
property as an umbrella description of copyright, trademark, and patent. 
Property, unlike patent, trademark, and copyright, lacks an expiration 
date, and implies an entitlement in perpetuity. Any debate on copyright 
term extensions is now framed in a context of property protection. Thus, 
rather than a discussion beginning from the analysis of what is best for 
the ostensible knowledge advancement ends of copyright, the default 
shifts to center around the value of private property preservation. This 
shift is made easier because it aligns with already engrained market-
based value frameworks. Discourse framing can alter the value criteria of 
copyright debate and legislation, thus changing the status quo bias in 
such a way that will benefit the debate’s winner. Content industries have 
used framing to their advantage, justifying term extensions with the 
rhetoric of preventing property loss, crucial to economic engines.69
¶34 Intellectual property battles are fought by shifting groups, 
defined generally as “users of information and as afflicted by a similar 
set of problems that could be expressed . . . in terms of intellectual 
property and information economics and structures of innovation.”
  
70
                                                                                                                       
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1813&co
ntext=fac_pubs
 
Similar groups were formed by the so-called “content industries”, who 
forged an originally uneasy alliance based on “forging a common 
identity as intellectual property industries, and by framing the use of their 
. 
68 Severine Dusollier, Contract Options for Individual Artists: Master's Tools v. 
The Master's House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
271, 283 (2006) (quoting NIVA ELKIN-KOREN, A PUBLIC-REGARDING 
APPROACH TO CONTRACTING OVER COPYRIGHTS, IN EXPANDING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 192 (R.C. Dreyfuss, D. L. 
Zimmerman & H. First eds. 2001)).  
69 It is interesting to also note that entertainment companies have generally been 
the most successful in their lobbying, perhaps because it is easier to 
conceptually separate Mickey Mouse and company from the conception of 
“knowledge” that the Copyright Clause looks to promote.  
70 Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 863-64.  
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products without permission as ‘theft.’”71 The conceptual battle is then 
between framing intellectual property as a knowledge advancement issue 
or a freedom of speech issue, and framing intellectual property as an 
“indispensable tool of modern economic management.”72
¶35 From a knowledge policy standpoint, Google’s financial might 
combined with the interests of its partner libraries has created a bloc 
strong enough to impact orphan works policy.
 
73
¶36 If or when an eventual settlement does coagulate, it will be the 
most prominent recent example of the private ordering phenomenon in 
copyright law. In essence, “[p]rivate ordering operates when the rule-
making process regarding the use of information is privatized, and the 
legal power to define the boundaries of public access to information is 
delegated to private parties.”
  
74
VIII. DIGITAL LIBRARIES AND DIGITAL LOCKS 
 Such a system resembles one of real 
property rights wrapped in contractual protection, and could serve to 
further weaken copyright as a tool of knowledge advancement in favor of 
a conception grounded in real property rules. 
¶37 Private ordering is not a counterbalance to framing momentum. 
Rather, private ordering seeks to maximize economic benefit from within 
a given frame. In turn, this maximizes the economic activity dependant 
on that intellectual model. Ultimately, the cost of multiple changes in 
private alignment incentivizes pressure groups to lobby for legislative 
framings that help maintain benefits they currently enjoy. Legislative 
reluctance to upset the status quo of good business further entrenches 
such framing. Here, GBS threatens to cement existing conceptions of 
copyright law as primarily remunerative in function, and founded in the 
same roots as real property rights. GBS has the opportunity to seed an 
expansive digital public domain, but the rights-holders they negotiate 
with have incentive to maximize digital rights protection in order to 
leverage the long tail benefits of aggregated rights holdings. The 
resulting economic model has serious implications for copyright law. 
A. The Long Tail and Author Incentive  
¶38 The long tail does not provide additional incentive to authors for 
work creation. Consider that the value of the long-tail is in aggregation. 
                                                     
71 Id. at 848.  
72 Id. at 867.  
73 See id. at 857 (“Acts of framing can create a sense of commonality between 
people who previously understood themselves as unrelated. They can also 
render interests that are diffuse suddenly salient, particularly once we 
incorporate nonmaterial interests into our theories of action.”).   
74 Dusollier, supra note 68.  
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While digitization may marginally bolster the demand of some works 
over the long term (and in rare cases, reinvigorate demand), the model 
for individual works is still the same as it is in most content fields, with 
the overwhelming majority of revenue being made on the initial print 
runs. After all, if a book is not sufficiently in demand to warrant 
continued printing, there is little reason to think that GBS will suddenly 
result in a windfall for potential authors.75
¶39 Google is consolidating and assuming the risk of liability on 
orphan works through the use of an opt-out settlement, and hopes to 
mitigate that risk with the carrot of digital revenue. To that end, it is 
unclear if the long tail is sufficient on an individual level to induce 
owners of orphan works to come out of the woodwork. Surely, any 
positive amount of revenue is better than none at all, but owners of 
orphan works in some cases may not even know that they are the rightful 
copyright holder—for instance, small estates or since-merged  publishing 
companies—and the cost involved in determining whether or not they are 
entitled to any revenue may exceed the actual revenue itself. This in 
itself may not be problematic for the public domain. Scholars can still 
access works whose owners have not shown up to remove them from the 
system, and an orphan work in GBS is virtually in the public domain if 
no one ever claims it, aside from Google having control of the digital 
copy.  
  
¶40 Thus, if digitization does not provide sufficient consistent 
revenue to induce the creation of additional works, the benefits are 
confined to remuneration. The danger of rent-seeking from a GBS 
settlement is extremely high. Given both the aforementioned ambiguity 
in old contractual arrangements between publishers and authors as well 
as the relatively low revenue for each individual author compared to the 
potentially high aggregate revenue of a large publishing portfolio, 
publishers are incentivized to claim copyright on as many works as 
possible, including works to which they have at best dubious claims. 
Again, the proceedings to prove the contrary may be more costly than 
any expected benefit for individual authors. This ambiguity is 
exacerbated by the complete lack of contractual language regarding 
digital and e-book rights for older books.76
                                                     
75 One exception to this is the movie industry, which has used the advent of 
home video to in effect have two waves of revenue per product. While this 
perhaps allows more movies to be greenlit (albeit of sometimes questionable 
quality), for obvious reasons this model is not duplicable in publishing (i.e. there 
is no counterpart to making people pay for a movie twice).  
 This is again endemic of 
76 See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Legal Battles Over E-Book Rights to Older Books, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/business/media/13ebooks.html.  
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private ordering, which rather than seeking to revise ambiguities or 
problems in current legislative structure, instead looks to each party to 
maximize their economic return through contract, for better or for ill. 
Here, publishers are able to advantage the ambiguous contractual market 
for out of print books, at the cost of author compensation and incentive.  
B. Remuneration and Knowledge 
¶41 Private ordering is an economically optimizing phenomenon, and 
as such, is ignorant of the non-economic impacts such ordering may 
have. In essence, copyright law uses economic means to promote non-
economic ends – the constitutionally enumerated “Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”77
¶42 Thus, it might be suggested that any additional protection 
beyond what is necessary to induce new work is detrimental to copyright 
and to progress. By maximizing economic remuneration for aggregate 
rights holders while failing to significantly contribute to the inducement 
of new work creation, private ordering may create social waste. The ripe 
opportunity for rent-seeking with digital projects such as GBS suggests 
that on the whole, copyright holders could take more from the public 
domain than they contribute.  
 Thus, any additional economic controls are only 
useful to copyright to the extent that it continues to further promote 
progress. It is the duty of Congress to determine the optimal balance of 
inducement and open access in order to encourage new writings and 
discovery. This balance is justified by the understanding that copyrighted 
works are not created in a vacuum, and that progress nearly always 
builds upon previous works.  
¶43 Private ordering is unable to mitigate an overbearing copyright 
scheme. While in the aggregate it may breathe new life into orphan 
works, this comes at the cost of increased incentives for large rights-
holders to remonetize forgotten works in order to maximize their long-
tail revenue. Further, publishers now have renewed incentive to join the 
pressure groups of the other large content-industries in pushing for 
increasing copyright term extensions, because digitization now enables 
them to continue benefitting from even unpopular older works.  
¶44 A possible counterweight here may be university libraries who 
are offering their collections for scan and use. While is possible that 
libraries will push for works to become digitally free for access by 
anyone once the copyrights expire, the amount of leverage they have is 
likely small, as libraries do not own copyrights. In fact, libraries may 
eventually be cut out of the project as publishers move to contribute 
digital versions of the books they both currently print and printed in the 
                                                     
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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past. Rightsholders will also certainly balk at Google continuing to 
collect ad revenue from queries for books to their books that enter the 
public domain.  
¶45 Private ordering is incapable of addressing the underlying issues 
with the present state of copyright law, and in particular it is unable to 
resolve copyright’s non-economic goals. Here, although private ordering 
has almost inadvertently managed to work around orphan works, it has 
also incentivized rent-seeking and threatens the public domain.  
IX. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? 
¶46 Economic efficiency is ultimately a strong variable in 
determining appropriate policy. Landes and Posner suggest a novel 
approach to optimizing economic efficiency in copyright: shortening 
copyright terms, increasing fees for term renewal, and allowing near-
indefinite renewal.78 Basing their argument on historical data, they argue 
that the amount of renewed copyrights under this sort of system would be 
a “tiny fraction” of all copyrights.79 Landes and Posner analogize to 
trademark in order to suggest that indefinite copyright renewals “need 
not starve the public domain.”80  In theory, this allows for a self-sorting 
market in that those works determined by their authors to still have 
exploitable value are renewed, while those that are not are free to the 
public domain.81
¶47 Digitization has zeroed the cost of additional distribution. 
Consider that prior to a digital model, book copyright holders in Landes 
and Posner’s world would have had to account for the cost of publishing 
a new run of books—however small—,in addition to the cost of 
renewing the copyright, and whether the profit would outweigh these 
costs.
 
82
                                                     
78 Landes and Posner, supra note 38. 
 With GBS, rights-holders essentially make the bet that they will 
collect at least the renewal fee in access and ad micropayments over the 
term of the copyright. Landes and Posner suggest ten year terms for 
copyright renewal, and even with a fee of several hundred dollars, this 
might be a feasible proposition for many more books. The question of 
projected profitability does not change, but the additional costs incurred 
to distribute the work are now next to nothing, meaning the potential 
range of copyright protected works may be much broader under this 
model, ultimately harming the public domain. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 4; see generally id. at 26–41.  
81 Id. at 4 
82 Their paper also suggests that one might renew a copyright in the hopes of a 
new reprinting, id. at 40, but in either case a risk calculation is involved as to 
whether a potential profitable run will actually occur.  
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¶48 Landes and Posner dismiss public-goods problems, essentially 
arguing that without any copyright protection, there is no incentive to 
maintain existing works, leading to inefficiencies such as congestion 
externalities.83
¶49 Landes and Posner provide a potentially novel approach that 
emphasizes private ordering to achieve economically optimal results and 
prevent orphan works issues. However, the declining marginal costs of 
digitization still incentivizes publishers to use digital locks to control 
both works they own and works they do not. Regardless of the copyright 
model, the economic incentives involved raise the question as to the 
feasibility of a public domain in the digital era.  
 Here, framing comes into play, as Google and its partner 
libraries actually do have incentive to maintain digital book databases 
that are inclusive of public domain works, for both search ad revenue and 
general institutional missions. Further, copyright over-protection is 
similarly inefficient, as the orphan works problem erects barriers 
preventing those who actually wish to exploit the work from doing so.  
CONCLUSIONS 
¶50 Are the incomplete solutions of private ordering the best ones we 
can hope for? The overwhelming pressure group imbalance, coupled 
with an endowment bias, makes the reversal of existing term extensions 
an unlikely prospect. However, this does not preclude an evolving 
conception of intellectual property and its corresponding values. How 
then will the underlying problems of copyright law be solved? It may be 
that private ordering can indirectly provide a solution. GBS could prove 
to be a catalyzing event for critics of current intellectual property policy 
as it brings the negative impacts of excessive term limits to the political 
front burner.  
¶51 The so-called “access to knowledge” movement is pushing for 
new models to govern the flow of information-based goods, and has so 
far primarily gained steam in the international development context.84
                                                     
83 Id. at 3, 11.  
 
The sheer volume of academic and policy discussion generated as a 
result of the GBS settlement only makes it more likely that actors will 
coalesce into a strong movement for improved information policies. It 
may be then that private ordering provides a cognizable frame of 
reference for groups to react to. This is not to understate the level of 
resistance that this new potential movement would be facing. Private 
ordering is already causing publishing interests to reframe the direction 
of their advocacy, much like a budding social movement, and surely they 
will push hard to keep this new potential long-term source of revenue. 
84 See Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 833.  
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Private ordering, then, is best seen as perhaps just another pull in the 
ongoing policy tug-of-war, albeit one that shakes more individuals into 
action. 
¶52 Is a public domain possible in the digital era? Surely the 
newfound ease of distribution would suggest an answer in the 
affirmative. However, in order to maximize the benefit of the 
information age, it is imperative that we succeed in preserving as much 
knowledge as possible before it disintegrates. In that process, we have 
the opportunity to undo the wasteful traps preventing orphan works from 
being fully utilized and built upon. It is critical that in taking advantage 
of this opportunity, we are careful not to erect larger, more complex 
barriers to access, and refrain from sacrificing the progress ends of 
copyright to digital revenue’s ever-growing long tail. 
 
